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THE NEw FINANCIAL ORDER:
AN ESSAY FOR ALAN BROMBERG
Joel Seligman*
N the aftermath of the 2008-2009 financial crisis, I characterized its
causes broadly:
L First, there was an ongoing economic emergency, initially rooted in
the housing and credit markets, which has been succeeded by the collapse
of several leading investment and commercial banks and insurance com-
panies, dramatic deterioration of stock market indices, and a rapidly
deepening recession.
Second, there were serious breakdowns in the enforcement and fraud
deterrence missions of federal financial regulation, notably as illustrated
by matters involving Bear Stearns and the other four then independent
investment banks subject to the SEC's former Consolidated Supervised
Entities program, the government creation of conservatorships for Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac, and the Bernard Madoff case.
Third, there was a misalignment between federal financial regulation
and financial firms and intermediaries. The structure of financial regula-
tion that was developed during the 1930s did not keep pace with funda-
mental changes in finance.
In the New Deal period, most finance was atomized into separate in-
vestment banking, commercial banking, or insurance firms. By 2008, fi-
nance was dominated by financial holding companies, which operated in
each of these and cognate areas such as commodities.
In the New Deal period, the challenge of regulating finance was do-
mestic. By 2008 when credit markets were increasingly reliant on trades
originating from abroad, major financial institutions traded simultane-
ously throughout the world, and information technology had made inter-
national money transfers virtually instantaneous-the fundamental
challenge was increasingly international.
In 1930, approximately 1.5 percent of the American public directly
owned stock on the New York Stock Exchange. A report estimated that
in the first quarter of 2008, approximately 47 percent of U.S. households
owned equities or bonds. A dramatic deterioration in stock prices af-
fected the retirement plans and the livelihood of millions of Americans.
* President, University of Rochester; author of The Transformation of Wall Street:
A History of the Securities and Exchange Commission and Modern Finance (3rd ed. 2003),
and coauthor with Louis Loss and Troy Parades, Securities Regulation (11 Volumes)
(4th-5th eds.).
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In the New Deal period, the choice of financial investments was largely
limited to stocks, debt, and bank accounts. By 2008, we lived in an age of
complex derivative instruments, some of which experience had shown
were not well understood by investors and on some occasions by issuers
or counterparties.
Most significantly, our system of finance was more fragile than earlier
believed. The web of interdependency that was the hallmark of sophisti-
cated trading meant that when a major firm such as Lehman Brothers
went bankrupt, cascading impacts had powerful effects on an entire
economy.1
While this is a useful catalog of many of the causes of the crash, I now
believe it is more illuminating to distinguish proximate causes such as an
ongoing economic emergency initially rooted in the housing and credit
markets from ultimate causes, of which one, the misalignment between
financial regulation and the new financial order, is by far the most
important.
The financial history of much of the 20th and 21st centuries is a history
of convergence. After a high point of atomization during the New Deal
when finance effectively was separated into investment banking, commer-
cial banking, and insurance firms with corresponding banking, securities,
and insurance regulation, the past several decades have largely been char-
acterized by the emergence of financial holding companies which operate
in all or virtually all financial arenas.2
1. Joel Seligman, Key Implications of the Dodd-Frank Act for Independent Regula-
tory Agencies, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 1 (2011). See generally 6 Louis Loss, JOEL SELIGMAN
& TROY PARADES, SECURITIES REGULATION 419-61 (4th ed. 2011).
2. As of 2012, the total assets of the United States securities sector equaled $4.7 tril-
lion. In 2013, the banking sector had assets of $14.7 trillion, and the insurance industry held
assets totaling $6 trillion. SIFMA, Fact Book 2013 at 25; Financial Stability Oversight
Council, 2014 Annual Report at 67, 73, available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/
Documents/.
For a long time, one generalization was safe: public distributions in this country were
generally underwritten by investment bankers. National banks, national bank holding com-
panies, and their affiliated securities companies were prohibited from underwriting securi-
ties by sections 16 and 21 of the Glass-Steagall Act. Sec. Indus. Ass'n v. Bd. of Governors
of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 468 U.S. 137, 140 (1984) (popularly known as the A. G. Becker
case to distinguish it from a companion case with the identical case name). In the compan-
ion case, Sec. Indus. Ass'n. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 468 U.S. 207, 220
(1984) (popularly known as the Schwab case), the Court held that it was permissible for a
bank holding company to acquire a non-banking affiliate engaged in securities brokerage
activities.
Before the Glass-Steagall Act, commercial banks, trust companies, and their affiliated
securities companies used to underwrite in large volume. See Franklin Escher, Investments,
78 BANKERS' MAG. 1025 (1909); V. CAROSSO, INVESTMENT BANKING IN AMERICA: A His-
TORY 368-75 (1970); EDWARDS & ScoTr, Regulating the Solvency of Depository Institu-
tions: A Perspective for Deregulation, in ISSUES IN FINANCIAL REGULATION 65 (F. Edwards
ed., 1979). But all companies engaged in the business of receiving deposits had to stop
(except for government and municipal securities and a few other special types) with the
divorcement of commercial and investment banking in the Glass-Steagall Banking Act of
1933.
Then, in 1999, sections 20 and 32 of the Glass-Steagall Act were repealed by the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act, effectively ending the remaining barriers between commercial and in-
vestment banking. See generally Laurence H. Meyer, F Hodge O'Neal Corporate and Se-
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One measure of this convergence of the preeminence of bank owner-
ship of securities firms was the 2008 collapse of the SEC Consolidated
Supervised Entity (CSE) program which earlier oversaw the five largest
investment banking holding companies (Bear Stearns, Goldman Sachs,
JP Morgan, Merrill Lynch and Lehman Brothers). After the publicly ac-
knowledged failure of the SEC's CSE oversight3 , the oversight of the en-
during investment bank holding companies was transferred to the Federal
Reserve Board.4 Similarly, today Merrill Lynch, one of the nation's larg-
est broker-dealers, for example, is owned by Bank of America. 5
Financial regulation, however, remains largely atomized with separate
federal and state banking agencies, federal and state securities regulation
and state insurance commissions. The atomized regulatory structure has
increasingly proven inadequate because of the rivalrous behavior of the
regulators, inadequate information, misconceived objectives, and political
obstacles. We have developed a financial regulatory system that often
works well enough in routine circumstances, but is inadequate to deal
with fast moving crises or to address wise policy formation to reduce the
likelihood of systemic crisis. To put it simply, the problem with the
United States' approach to financial regulation is not that it tolerates
firms too big to fail. The problem is that the regulatory structure is too
divided to effectively regulate large firms.
curities Law Symposium: The Modernization of Financial Services Legislation, 77 WASH.
U. L. Q. 277 (1999); Lissa L. Broome & Jerry W. Markham, Banking and Insurance: Before
and After the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 25 IOWA J. CORP. L. 723, 755 (2000); Jonathan R.
Macey, The Business of Banking: Before and After Gramm-Leach-Bliley, 25 IOWA J. CORP.
L. 691 (2000); O'Neal, Summary and Analysis of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 28 SEC.
REG. L.J. 95 (2000); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. Financial
Services Industry, 1975-2000: Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risks, 2002 U.
ILL. L. REV. 215, 219 (2002).
3. See SEC Press Release 2008-230, SEC, Chairman Cox Announces End of Consoli-
dated Supervised Entities Program (Sept. 26, 2008). Cox stated in part:
The last six months have made it abundantly clear that voluntary regulation
does not work. When Congress passed the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, it cre-
ated a significant regulatory gap by failing to give to the SEC or any agency
the authority to regulate large investment bank holding companies, like
Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch, Lehman Brothers, and Bear
Stearns....
As I have reported to the Congress multiple times in recent months, the
CSE program was fundamentally flawed from the beginning, because invest-
ment banks could opt in or out of supervision voluntarily. The fact that in-
vestment bank holding companies could withdraw from this voluntary
supervision at their discretion diminished the perceived mandate of the CSE
program, and weakened its effectiveness.
Cox's statement was prompted by a damning report from the SEC Office of Inspector
General, SEC's Oversight of Bear Stearns and Related Entities: The Consolidated Entity
Program (Rep. No. 446-A2008, 2008). See summary, Loss ET AL., supra note 1, at 428-34.
4. See, e.g., Dafna Avraham, Patricia Selvaggi & James Vickery, A Structural View of
U.S. Bank Holding Companies, 18 FED. RES. BNY ECON. POL'Y REV. 65 (July 2012).
5. See Bank of America 10-K (year ending 12-31-2013) at 71, available at http://
www.sec.gov/Archives:
The Corporation's principal U.S. broker/dealer subsidiaries are Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith (MLPF&S) and Merrill Lynch Professional
Clearing Corp. (MLPCC). MLPCC is a fully-guaranteed subsidiary of
MLPF&S and provides clearing and settlement services.
2015]
SMU LAW REVIEW
The 2008-2009 financial markets collapse and the 2010 Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act prompted a partial re-
sponse to regulatory misalignment.
The Act did attempt to address systemic economic risk by establishing
the Financial Stability Oversight Council, which includes members from
the Department of Treasury, the Federal Reserve Board, the Comptroller
of the Currency, the newly created Bureau of Consumer Financial Protec-
tion, the SEC, the FDIC, the CFTC, the Federal Housing Funding
Agency, and the National Credit Union Administration Board. The Act
also grants the Council authority to require new capital, liquidity, and risk
management standards for banks and nonbank financial companies.6
6. See discussion 6 Louis Loss, JOEL SELIGMAN & TROY PARADES, SECURITIES
REGULATION ch. 8.A.1 (4th ed. 2011).
The emphasis in the Council's duties is on monitoring and deterrence rather than crisis
management, which statutorily is delegated to the Federal Reserve Board and Federal De-
posit Insurance Corporation. Through the enactment and Conference Report process,
many provisions in the Act were compromised in order to ensure passage. Section
112(a)(2)(L), for example, limits the Council's role with respect to existing or proposed
accounting principles, standards or procedures, to review and comment, rather than an
approval or veto role.
Section 113(a)(1) authorizes the Council on a vote of no fewer than two-thirds of the vot-
ing members then serving, including an affirmative vote of the Chairperson, to require that
a United States nonbank financial company be supervised by the Federal Reserve Board of
Governors and subject to prudential standards as defined in section 115 if "the Council
determines that material financial distress at the U.S. nonbank financial company, or the
nature, scope, size, scale, concentration, interconnectedness, or mix of the activities of the
U.S. nonbank financial company, could pose a threat to the financial stability of the United
States."
Section 113(c) authorizes the Federal Reserve to supervise the financial activities of any
company incorporated or organized in the United States or abroad when the Council on a
two-thirds vote determines that the Company's material financial distress of the company
"would pose a threat to the financial stability of the United States." Section 113(c)(1)(B)
requires a determination that "the company is organized or operates in such a manner as
to evade the application of this title."
Section 119 addresses a different type of challenge in the pre-Dodd-Frank Act regulatory
structure, by empowering the Council to make recommendations to resolve a dispute
among two or more of its members, when:
(1) a member agency has a dispute with another member agency about the
respective jurisdiction over a particular bank holding company, nonbank fi-
nancial company, or financial activity or product (excluding matters for
which another dispute mechanism specifically has been provided under title
x);
(2) the Council determines that the disputing agencies cannot, after a
demonstrated good faith effort, resolve the dispute without the intervention
of the Council; and
(3) any of the member agencies involved in the dispute -
(A) provides all other disputants prior notice of the intent to request dis-
pute resolution by the Council; and
(B) requests in writing, not earlier than 14 days after providing the notice
described in subparagraph (A), that the Council seek to resolve the
dispute.
Recommendations under section 119(c)(3) require an affirmative vote of two-thirds of the
voting members of the Council then serving, but are not binding "on the Federal agencies
that are parties to the dispute."
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The Dodd-Frank Act addressed what were perceived to be critical gaps
or omissions in financial regulation by extending SEC jurisdiction to in-
vestment advisers, to hedge funds, and to other private equity fund advis-
ers,7 authorizing the CFTC and SEC to regulate OTC derivatives, 8 and
enhancing SEC authority to regulate credit rating agencies. 9
The enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act ushered in a new period in U.S.
financial regulation in which the regulatory departments and agencies are
less independent of each other, the White House, and Congress. By em-
phasizing financial stability and risk reduction as paramount goals, the
Dodd-Frank Act stressed the need for regulatory coordination, elimina-
tion of some gaps and omissions, and regulatory tools to optimize early
warning and prompt responses to a burgeoning crisis.
But the new approach to financial regulation built on the structure of
the old financial regulatory agencies. The Dodd-Frank Act strengthens
the SEC, the CFTC, the Department of the Treasury, the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency, the FDIC, and especially the Federal Re-
serve System.
Indeed, much of the lengthy text of the Act appears to have been writ-
ten by these agencies' or department's staffs. Only one agency-the late
unlamented Office of Thrift Supervision-was abolished. Only one new
agency-the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection-was established.
The Dodd-Frank Act did not go far enough either to provide an effec-
tive structure to reduce as much as is reasonably possible the probability
of the next catastrophic financial failure nor did the Act fully develop
policies that will effectively address systemic risk.
What should be done? Underlying the limits of Dodd-Frank is the ten-
sion between an idea of a single coordinating agency such as Japan's Min-
istry of Finance, which in the United States' case would directly report to
the President, and the more customized set of agencies currently extant in
the United States, some of whom, such as the Securities and Exchange
Commission, are designed at least to be in theory politically
independent. 10
The Financial Stability Oversight Council is an awkward and to date
largely toothless coordinator. The fact that its response to the August
The Council, in other words, is a mediator, not an arbitrator. How much effect this provi-
sion will have in reducing the disputes that have bedeviled the SEC and CFTC and the
depository regulatory institutions in resolving competing jurisdictions is uncertain. This
heavily compromised provision may end up delivering far less than anticipated. Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat.
1376 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act].
7. See discussion in 7 Louis Loss, JOEL SELIGMAN & TROY PARADES, SECURITIES
REGULATION ch. 8.C.2 (4th ed. 2012).
8. See discussion in 5 Louis Loss, JOEL SELIGMAN & TROY PARADES, SECURITIES
REGULATION ch. 7.A.5 (4th ed. 2010).
9. See discussion in 3 Louis Loss, JOEL SELIGMAN & TROY PARADES, SECURITIES
REGULATION ch. 3.B.2.b (5th ed. 2015).




2012 failure of the Commission to adopt new money market rules was a
set of "proposed recommendations" in November 2012 is a measure of its
weakness. 1
There is a wiser way to address the tension between the command-and-
control and atomized models suggested by Constitutional law. We have
one written Constitution of the United States, but operate under U.S.
Supreme Court precedent as if we have two. During war time, the Consti-
tution has consistently been interpreted differently than during peace
time.' 2 As Justice Holmes memorably wrote in Schenck v. United States:
"When a nation is at war many things that might be said in time of peace
are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured
so long as men fight and no Court would regard them as protected by any
constitutional right.' 13
As a practical matter, we have followed a similar approach with respect
to financial emergencies. Under the formal rules, if an emergency is dire
enough, the White House, the Department of Treasury, and the Federal
Reserve largely take over. If appropriations are necessary, Congress also
is involved, typically through an accelerated process. 14
Our economy would be most wisely regulated through a hybrid system.
During financial emergencies and with respect to designated rules de-
signed to reduce systemic risk, a small decisional body chaired by the
Secretary of the Treasury should have the power of rule and policy adop-
tion. This unequivocally would reduce agency independence but essen-
tially only during or to prevent financial emergency.
In other circumstances, the atomized current structure largely would be
retained. However, even during nonemergency circumstances, it would
be wise to simplify regulatory oversight in three ways.
First, the dysfunction of a rivalrous SEC, Commodities Futures Trading
Commission (CTFC), and multiple federal banking agencies should be
simplified. The SEC and CFTC should be combined. The Federal Re-
serve banking regulator, Comptroller of the Currency, and Federal De-
posit Insurance Corporation also should be consolidated.
Second, insurance regulation should be modernized by adopting a con-
current federal-state regulatory model today similar to that employed in
11. See 1 Louis Loss, JOEL SELIGMAN & TROY PARADES, SECURITIES REGULATION
ch. l.H.6.(iv) (5th ed. 2014).
12. See, e.g., RONALD ROTUNDA, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, chs. 5-1 & 10-1
(10th ed. 2012).
13. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
14. See adoption of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, with its $700
billion Troubled Assets Relief Program within a few weeks of the Lehman Brothers failure.
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765.
In a crisis the Federal Reserve Board and the FDIC become the operational executors of
the Dodd-Frank Act's provisions to reduce systemic risk.
Upon an affirmative vote of two-thirds of the voting members of the Council then serving,
section 121 of the Dodd-Frank Act authorizes the Federal Reserve Board to take actions
to mitigate risks posed by a covered bank holding company or nonbank financial company
when such a company "poses a grave threat to the financial stability of the United States."
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the banking and securities industries. A Federal Insurance Commission
should address interstate life, property, and other forms of insurance; in-
trastate regulation should remain with state commissions.
Third, as much as possible, new enabling legislation should establish
common regulatory standards applicable to all competitive, covered fi-
nancial firms. The most effective provision of Dodd-Frank created en-
hanced prudential standards, applicable to nonbank financial companies
and large interconnected bank holding companies.15 A combination of
the passage of time, which strengthened the ability of regulated firms to
resist stating new standards, and the increased exactitude of judicial re-
view 16 have diminished the likelihood that regulatory agencies can effec-
tively adopt new standards concerning other consequential topics, such as
the Volcker Rule. 17
Will this type of approach ever occur? The conventional wisdom today
is that political considerations make any approach like this improbable.
This is, of course, correct under current circumstances. But someday
there may be yet another financial meltdown and the misalignment of the
current system of the financial regulator to the new financial order will be
writ large. I hope that day never comes. But if it does, I hope we more
effectively address the structure of our financial system than we have to
date.
15. Section 115 authorizes the Council "in order to prevent or mitigate risks to the
financial stability of the United States that could arise from the material financial distress,
failure, or ongoing activities of large, interconnected financial institutions," to make rec-
ommendations to the Federal Reserve "concerning the establishment and refinement of
prudential standards and reporting and disclosure requirements applicable to nonbank fi-
nancial companies ... and large, interconnected bank holding companies." These recom-
mendations may be more stringent than those that do not present similar risks.
Enhanced prudential standards are a pivotal risk reduction technique in the Dodd-Frank
Act. Section 115(b) provides:
The recommendations of the Council ... may include -
(A) risk-based capital requirements;
(B) leverage limits;
(C) liquidity requirements;
(D) resolution plan and credit exposure report requirements;
(E) concentration limits;
(F) a contingent capital requirement;
(G) enhanced public disclosures;
(H) short-term debt limits; and
(I) overall risk management requirements." Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 6, § 115.
Significantly, section 1650) directs the Federal Reserve to require each covered bank hold-
ing company or each supervised nonbank financial company to maintain a debt to equity
ratio of no more than 15 to 1, but the Federal Reserve Board only is required to do so,
"upon a determination by the Council that such company poses a grave threat to the finan-
cial stability of the United States and that the imposition of such requirement is necessary
to mitigate the risk that such company poses to the financial stability of the United
States .. " Id. § 1650).
16. See, e.g., 10 Louis Loss, JOEL SELIGMAN & TROY PARADES, SECURITIES REGULA-
TION ch. 12.C (4th ed. 2013).
17. The Volcker Act prohibits specified financial institutions from proprietary trading
and sponsoring or investing in hedge funds and private equity funds. Avraham et al., supra
note 4.
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